Is it a guarantee of technology or a binding of interests? A discussion on the bundled sale of automated production equipment and processing materials.

In the current wave of industrial automation sweeping the globe, automated production equipment has become a core support for improving the quality and efficiency of the manufacturing industry. Processing materials, as "partners" in the operation of this equipment, are being sold in tandem with it, sparking widespread controversy within the industry. One side argues that this bundling is a necessary technical means to ensure optimal equipment performance and mitigate production risks; the other side bluntly states that it is a form of "profit-driven kidnapping" by equipment manufacturers using their market dominance to lock in users and extract excessive profits. The protective film sector in the 3C electronics industry is particularly affected. In industries such as lamination and printing automated processing equipment, some manufacturers explicitly require users to use their designated brands and specifications of protective film materials, a phenomenon that vividly illustrates this debate. This article will, based on industry realities, examine both sides of the argument, analyzing the essence and impact of this sales model.

For: Bundled sales are an inevitable choice for technological adaptation and a double guarantee of the rights and interests of both parties.

Those who support bundling automated equipment with processing materials prioritize "technological adaptation." They argue that this model is not forced bundling, but rather a rational design based on equipment performance, production efficiency, and product quality. Its essence is technological assurance rather than profit-driven coercion, protecting the technical reputation of equipment manufacturers and mitigating production risks for users.

Firstly, precise adaptation between automated equipment and processing materials is a prerequisite for ensuring production accuracy and product quality. The core of automated equipment development is "precise control." Its operating parameters and process standards are optimized for specific materials and specifications, especially in high-precision processing, where even slight differences in materials can lead to production failure. Taking automated protective film lamination equipment in the 3C electronics industry as an example, the lamination accuracy requirement for such equipment is 0.01 mm. However, protective films from different manufacturers vary significantly in terms of thickness uniformity, adhesion, and flexibility. Even a thickness deviation of only 0.005 mm for non-specified protective films can lead to problems such as misalignment, bubbles, and edge lifting, affecting not only the product's appearance but also potentially causing the protective film to lose its protective function, resulting in rework and scrapping of the final product. Flashmag's cleanroom tempered glass screen protector designed for the iQOO Neo9 series combines a fully automated dust removal chamber with a high-transparency PET substrate and a precise alignment layer. This deep adaptation of equipment and materials achieves "zero-error lamination," minimizing the failure rate. Essentially, it addresses user pain points with a system-level adaptation solution, rather than simply bundling for profit. Equipment manufacturers specifying materials are essentially to ensure optimal equipment performance and avoid production losses due to material incompatibility—a responsible approach to user production efficiency.

Secondly, bundled sales can reduce users' operating and decision-making costs, achieving a "worry-free and efficient" production model. For most manufacturing enterprises, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the lack of professional material selection teams makes it difficult to determine whether the wide variety of processing materials on the market are compatible with their equipment. Equipment manufacturers, through bundled sales, directly provide users with an integrated "equipment + materials" solution. Users don't need to spend time and manpower selecting materials, nor do they bear the risk of material incompatibility errors. At the same time, manufacturers can leverage their economies of scale to reduce material procurement costs, thus providing users with a more cost-effective integrated quote—combined packages often save 10%-20% compared to users purchasing equipment and materials separately. For example, Longchuan Machinery's automatic steel baling machine not only provides the equipment but also compatible steel wire materials. Through the synergistic optimization of equipment and materials, customers improve packaging efficiency, reduce labor costs, and lower the transportation damage rate to below 0.5%. The benefits of this compatibility far exceed the flexibility of "choosing materials independently."

Finally, bundled sales facilitate manufacturers to provide full-process after-sales service, ensuring the long-term stable operation of the equipment. After-sales maintenance of automated equipment involves not only the repair of the equipment itself but also is closely related to the usage specifications and wear patterns of the processed materials. If users use non-specified materials, manufacturers may struggle to determine whether equipment malfunctions are due to a problem with the equipment itself or material incompatibility. This not only prolongs after-sales response time but may also lead to disputes over liability. In contrast, with a bundled sales model, manufacturers have a thorough understanding of both equipment and materials' performance, enabling them to quickly pinpoint the cause of malfunctions and provide precise after-sales solutions. Furthermore, based on material usage, they can offer suggestions for equipment maintenance and process optimization, extending equipment lifespan. This integrated "equipment + materials + after-sales" service is essentially a means for manufacturers to improve service quality, not a tool to "hold users hostage."

Opposing Viewpoint: Bundled Sales are a Hidden Tactic of Market Monopoly, Essentially a Form of Manufacturer Profit-Driven Hijacking

Those opposing the bundling of automated equipment with processing materials argue that while this model appears reasonable, it is in reality a form of profit-driven hijacking by equipment manufacturers leveraging their market advantages to deprive users of their choice and extract excessive profits. This is especially true in industries where monopolies have formed, as such bundling not only harms user interests but also hinders healthy competition.

Firstly, bundled sales deprive users of their right to choose, forcing them to accept "premium materials." In the automated equipment market, some manufacturers, relying on technological advantages or brand influence, have achieved a certain degree of market dominance, and then forcibly bundle processing materials with equipment, explicitly stating "no use of specified materials, no guarantee of product quality," thus coercing users into passive acceptance. In this situation, even if users can find more cost-effective and better-suited alternative materials, they dare not choose them for fear of losing after-sales support. Taking 3C electronic protective film processing equipment as an example, some equipment manufacturers specify protective film materials that are more expensive than similar products on the market, but their quality is not significantly superior. By bundling sales, manufacturers use materials as a "profit growth point," indirectly increasing users' production costs. This "forced bundling + premium pricing" model essentially exploits users' dependence on equipment for unreasonable profit-making, and has nothing to do with "technical assurance."

Secondly, bundled sales hinder healthy competition in the materials industry and are detrimental to technological innovation. By bundling materials with their own equipment, equipment manufacturers create "entry barriers" for alternative materials—even if the alternatives are of higher quality and better value, they struggle to enter the market because users are "locked in" by the equipment manufacturers. In this situation, designated material manufacturers lack competitive pressure and do not need to invest in technological research and development or quality improvement. Instead, they can maintain high premiums in the long term by leveraging their bundling advantages. Other material manufacturers, due to market access difficulties, struggle to expand their scale, and their motivation for technological innovation is severely suppressed. For example, in the protective film sector of the 3C electronics industry, because most equipment manufacturers have designated materials, small and medium-sized protective film companies find it difficult to break through market barriers. Even if a company develops a new type of protective film that is more environmentally friendly and more wear-resistant, it is difficult to promote and apply it because it cannot be compatible with the equipment (deliberately restricted by equipment manufacturers). This bundling model ultimately leads to technological stagnation and severe homogenization in the materials industry, while users are forced to passively accept "high-priced, low-quality" materials, creating a vicious cycle of "manufacturers profiting, users suffering losses, and the industry stagnating."

Finally, some bundling practices are suspected of violating anti-monopoly regulations and constitute unreasonable market behavior. According to Article 18 of the "Regulations on Prohibiting Abuse of Market Dominance," operators with market dominance are prohibited from bundling goods without justifiable reasons or imposing other unreasonable transaction conditions. The bundling practices of some equipment manufacturers precisely meet the characteristics of "abuse of market dominance"—using their advantage in the equipment market to force users to purchase designated materials, violating transaction practices and consumer habits, and depriving users of their right to choose. Similar cases are not isolated incidents. During the pre-order period for the Nintendo Switch 2, the US retailer GameStop forced users to purchase accessories such as protective cases and screen protectors to qualify for pre-orders, sparking widespread user dissatisfaction and ultimately forcing rectification. This case fully illustrates that unregulated bundling is essentially a form of profit-sharing by manufacturers, not only harming user rights but also disrupting market order.

Conclusion: Balancing Technological Compatibility and Market Fairness, Rejecting the Extreme "Either/Or" Approach

Summarizing the viewpoints from both sides, it's clear that the bundled sale of automated production equipment and processing materials is not a black-and-white issue—it has a reasonable core of technological compatibility, but also the hidden danger of profit-driven coercion. The fundamental point of contention is not "whether bundling should be done," but "how": is it based on a "voluntary choice" of technological compatibility, or on "coercion" based on market monopoly? Is it to protect the rights of both parties, or to extract excessive profits?

For equipment manufacturers, technological assurance is fundamental, and reasonable compatibility suggestions are commendable, but this cannot be used as an excuse to force the bundling of materials and deprive users of their right to choose. Manufacturers can present "designated materials" as "recommended options," while clearly informing users of the compatibility standards for alternative materials, allowing users to choose independently. Furthermore, through comprehensive after-sales service, they can provide users with compatibility guidance, achieving a balance between "technological assurance" and "user autonomy." For users, it's crucial to raise their awareness of their rights. If they encounter unreasonable practices such as forced bundling or overpriced sales by manufacturers, they should protect their rights through legal channels. They should also rationally consider compatibility issues and avoid choosing incompatible materials in the blind pursuit of low prices, which could lead to production losses.

For regulatory authorities, it's essential to strengthen oversight of the automation equipment market, strictly enforce anti-monopoly regulations, and severely crack down on manufacturers abusing their market dominance and engaging in forced bundling. The boundaries between "reasonable compatibility" and "forced bundling" must be clearly defined to guide manufacturers towards standardized operations. Only in this way can we ensure both the technical precision and efficiency of automated production, maintain fair market competition, and achieve a win-win situation for equipment manufacturers, material suppliers, and end-users, promoting the healthy and sustainable development of the manufacturing automation industry. After all, true industry progress is never about "monopoly through bundling," but rather about "superior quality through competition."